'옮겨 쓴 이야기'에 해당되는 글 350건
- 2011.09.11 SOUTH KOREA: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN
- 2011.09.11 LEE MYUNG-BAK: SMOOTH SAILING TILL DECEMBER?
- 2011.09.11 언론이 전하는 미 외교전문
- 2011.09.11 2001-09-11
RT @mbcpdcho: 미국대사관에 정보제공하는데 protect해주는 사람이 또 있군요. http://bit.ly/qxzpbM 질병관리본부 이센터장. 유시민장관이 타미플루의 국내생산을 추진하도록 했다고 일러바칩니다.
| 06SEOUL3794 | 2006-11-03 04:53 |
| 06SEOUL3794 | 2006-11-03 04:53 |
2006-11-03 04:53
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (U) In preparation for a possible influenza pandemic, the
Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) has
unveiled its National Preparedness and Response Plan for
Pandemic Influenza. Officials at KCDC said the plan, drawn
up by medical experts at Korea University Medical School,
closely hews to World Health Organization (WHO)
recommendations. The plan has been endorsed by the Minister
of Health and Welfare. The Korean-language version of the
plan has been posted on the KCDC website
(http//www.cdc.go.kr), and KCDC expects to complete an
English summary of the plan before the end of November.
2. (C) The plan leaves for future resolution the question of
adding to Korea's stockpile of antiviral medications.
Current contracts will bring Korea's stockpile of Tamiflu to
980,000 courses within the next few weeks, and officials
expect to procure an additional 20,000 courses, to make a
round 1 million, before the end of 2006. KCDC officials told
ESTHoff on October 27 that a committee of influenza experts
had recommended that Korea plan a stockpile of 10 million
courses, but that the Minister of Health and Welfare is
opposed to additional stockpiling. End summary.
--------------------
KOREAN PANDEMIC PLAN
--------------------
3. (U) The draft pandemic plan is a hefty document at more
than 240 pages. It is based on a pandemic simulation model
(FluAid 2.0) that assumes that, over the first six weeks of
an outbreak, more than 8.8 million Koreans would fall ill,
more than 235,000 would require hospitalization, and more
than 54,000 would die.
---------------------------------------
MINISTER OPPOSES STOCKPILING OF TAMIFLU
---------------------------------------
4. (U) A key, but still undefined, element in the plan is
the possible acquisition of additional stocks of antiviral
drugs such as Tamiflu. Korea expects to have 1 million
courses (of 10 capsules each) of Tamiflu by the end of 2006.
Current contracts will bring the figure to 980,000 courses
over the next several weeks, and KCDC plans to let contracts
for an additional 20,000 courses to be secured by the end of
the year. The plan states that the stockpiled Tamiflu should
be stored under the custody of the central government and
administered within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms through
public healthcare centers and designated hospitals throughout
the country.
5. (U) Following WHO recommendations, Korea has prioritized
the allocation of available Tamiflu as shown in table 1 below:
Table 1: Estimates of Required Amount of Tamiflu in Phase 6
of Pandemic Period
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Cumulative
Estimated number required amount
Priority/Category of persons(1,000) Tamiflu(1,000 cap)
--------------------------------------------- --------------
For treatment and/or prophylaxis:
1/High-risk inpatients 236 2,121
2/Essential healthcare personnel 148 3,450
3/High-risk outpatients 1,150 13,794
4/Essential service workers 471 17,208
5/Outpatients over age 65 1,249 28,488
6/Other low-risk outpatients 5,915 81,685
For prophylaxis:
7/Other healthcare workers 301 90,727
8/Other essential service workers 916 100,700
9/High-risk medical group 4,253 233,742
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Note: For treatment, one capsule (75mg) twice a day for five
days; for prophylaxis, one capsule per day for a maximum of
42 days. The figures for the cumulative amounts appear to
assume that fewer capsules will actually be needed due to
deaths, immunity due to survival of the disease, absenteeism,
and other factors. End note.
6. (U) These figures suggest a potential need for 57 million
courses of antivirals to treat or protect nearly 15 million
vulnerable persons.
7. (C) The plan calls for the convening of a "National
Pandemic Experts Committee" to review the assessment of risk
and to recommend the amount and the timing of future
stockpiling of antiviral drugs. Lee Duk-hyoung, the Director
General of the Communicable Diseases Surveillance and
Response Center at KCDC, told ESTHoff on October 27 that in
fact the committee had already met and recommended that Korea
create a stockpile of 10 million courses. KCDC proposed to
add 2 million courses each year during the period 2007-2008,
to have a total of 5 million courses by 2009. However, Lee
(please protect) said, Rhyu Si-min, the Minister of Health
and Welfare, opposes any additional stockpiling. He observed
that Rhyu is close to former Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan, and
noted that the former Prime Minister was also opposed to
stockpiling.
8. (C) According to Lee, Minister Rhyu is instead interested
in examining ways that Korea could obtain the capability to
produce Tamiflu. Asked whether Rhyu was considering invoking
compulsory licensing authority under WTO rules to break the
patent (as suggested in the press last year -- see reftel),
Lee avoided a direct response. He asserted that the maker of
Tamiflu, Roche, has 16 subcontractors in 10 countries,
including Yuhan Pharmaceuticals in Korea, but that each of
the subcontractors handles just one of 10 critical processes
in the production of the drug. He further stated that Roche
has licensed two companies in China and one in India to make
the drug, and has shared its technology with South Africa for
use in Africa, but said that Roche had determined that Korea,
as a developed country, was not eligible for such
arrangements.
9. (C) Earlier in the week of October 23, KCDC had undergone
its annual "inspection" by the National Assembly. ESTHoff
asked Lee whether National Assembly committee questions had
demonstrated concern about the state of Korea's preparations
to confront a pandemic, including the size of its Tamiflu
stockpile. Lee responded that, to his disappointment, the
answer was, "not much."
--------------------------------------------- ------------
HESITATION REGARDING SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES CONTINUES
--------------------------------------------- ------------
10. (C) The Korean pandemic plan describes public health
measures that may be taken during a pandemic, including
social distancing measures such as the closure of educational
institutions and day-care facilities, limitations on or
prohibition of mass gatherings, contact tracing, and
confinement and quarantine. Especially if suspected patients
are reported or confirmed arriving from other countries
during phase 4 and 5 of the pandemic alert period, the plan
foresees that Korea would step up quarantine efforts at ports
of entry, and could take action to restrict overseas travel
from Korea. However, in the conversation with ESTHoff, Lee
continued to stress (cf reftel) that as a senior public
health advisor to the government, he would strongly hesitate
to advise social distancing measures in case of a pandemic,
citing the social and economic disruption such measures would
cause.
----------------------------------------
SHORTAGE OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL FACILITIES
----------------------------------------
11. (U) According to government data, as of June 2006 there
are a total of 382,000 hospital/clinic beds, 12,800 beds in
intensive care units (ICUs), and 5,900 artificial respiratory
apparatuses in Korea, with its population of 48 million.
There are 519 beds in isolation wards at 38 hospitals
nationwide. These facilities fall far short of what would be
needed to handle the estimated number of patients in case of
a pandemic. Although the Ministry of Health and Welfare
(MOHW) plans to increase the number of fully-equipped
isolation wards, the vast majority of victims of a pandemic
would have to be treated at home.
-------
COMMENT
-------
12. (C) To date, the risks of a pandemic have not achieved
the kind of visibility and broad political engagement that
have characterized the U.S. response. After a flurry of
press attention in the fall of 2005, the issue has dropped
from view. There was little or no reporting, for example, on
the nation-wide table top pandemic exercise held in
mid-October. The Blue House, swamped with hot-button issues
such as OPCON and the North Korean nuclear test, has remained
mute on the need to prepare for a pandemic, and now it
emerges that even the Health Minister is unpersuaded, at
least with regard to stockpiling of Tamiflu. Current stocks
would be inadequate for even the highest-priority uses in
case of a pandemic. It may be that it will take another
outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza in Korea, such as occurred
in 2003-2004, to refocus the politicians' minds on what needs
to be done. End comment.
VERSHBOW
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US embassy cable - 07SEOUL1711
LEE MYUNG-BAK: SMOOTH SAILING TILL DECEMBER?
| Identifier: | 07SEOUL1711 |
|---|---|
| Origin: | Embassy Seoul |
| Created: | 2007-06-05 09:40:00 |
| Classification: |
presidential front-runner Lee Myung-bak discussed North
Korea, the December elections, and the FTA. Lee also asked
the Ambassador to help set up a meeting with Secretary Rice
during his scheduled June 11-14 trip to Washington D.C. Lee
said he feared the progressives would try to make North Korea
a key issue in the presidential elections even though most
South Koreans were not as concerned over security issues as
they were over the economy. Lee noted that the North had to
denuclearize in order to reap the benefits of his proposed
assistance to improve the DPRK's economy. He said that
North Korea would try to influence the election, and that Kim
Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung were the two who most wanted to keep
the GNP out of the Blue House. On the FTA, Lee said the
U.S. decision to keep rice out of the KORUS FTA would be a
great help toward ratifying the agreement in Korea. He
noted, however, that it might be difficult to ratify the
agreement
before the December elections. If the GNP won, Lee said, it
would mean better relations with the U.S. and a more
advanced, globalized Korea. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------
NORTH KOREA'S IMPACT ON 2007 ELECTION
-------------------------------------
2. (C) Former Mayor Lee Myung-bak told the Ambassador on
June 4 that North Korea would have a big impact on the 2007
presidential elections. Recently, a North Korean press
release noted that Lee was a "puppet of the U.S." and, if Lee
won the election, it would lead to war. Since former
President Kim Dae-jung (DJ) and Kim Jong-il had the most to
fear from a Grand National Party (GNP) administration, they
would actively support any progressive candidate while
President Roh Moo-hyun would also work to keep the GNP out of
office. Lee said that many progressive lawmakers had
recently gone to North Korea and delivered the same message
to the North: that a GNP president would decrease stability
on the Peninsula. Several months ago, Lee sent a
representative to meet with a high-ranking DPRK official and
explain Lee's "3000 Unification Plan" (Ref A, a plan to raise
DPRK per capita GDP to USD 3000). Since that time, the North
has requested further details about the plan; so, despite
recent critiques, Lee was not convinced the North was
determined to undermine his candidacy.
3. (C) The Ambassador asked if Lee thought Kim Jong-il was
preparing some bold initiative to present to the ROK to move
inter-Korean relations forward and influence the elections.
Lee said that since Roh wanted a North-South summit so badly,
Kim Jong-il would make outrageous demands to which Roh might
accede. Despite the desire for a summit that Roh's advisors
have clearly communicated to the North, there has been no
positive response from Kim Jong-il. Lee surmised this might
indicate Kim Jong-il expects the GNP to win the presidential
election, and in that case, he knows he should not make too
many deals with the current president. Lee said that DPRK
officials consistently ask South Korean delegations what
South Korea would be like with Lee as president.
------------------------------
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
------------------------------
4. (C) Lee said this year's campaign marked the first time
the GNP has had a series of policy debates and an open
primary (Ref B). The debate series favored the trailing
candidates. Lee noted that the Roh government hoped Park
Geun-hye would become the GNP candidate since Roh thought any
progressive candidate could defeat her in the general
election. Lee said he would refrain from attacking Park in
the primary campaign and would not release information he had
on Park. Since he was the frontrunner, he should remain
"gentlemanly" toward Park. Lee said that there would be lots
of negative attacks on him from Park and from the
progressives, but he was not worried. The campaign structure
was seven people versus him - Roh, DJ, Kim Jong-il and the
GNP candidates all together against his candidacy.
5. (C) Lee said the ROK was at a crucial crossroads. If the
GNP took power in 2008, it would not only improve ROK-U.S.
relations but lead to a change in Korea's national identity.
Korea could become a more advanced, globalized country under
the GNP, or move further toward a more pro-North, pro-China
identity under another progressive regime. Lee noted that
the ROK had to improve economically in order to be ready for
eventual unification and the next administration should focus
on social welfare and decreasing the gap between the rich and
poor.
------------
PROGRESSIVES
------------
6. (C) Former President Kim Dae-jung (DJ) wants a single
progressive candidate and so does President Roh, Lee claimed,
but each wanted their own candidate so it might be difficult
for the progressives to unite. For example, DJ supported
former Gyeonggi Governor (and GNP defector) Sohn Hak-kyu, but
Roh could never support Sohn due to personal differences. So
there could be two progressive candidates. The only sure
thing, Lee said, was that the GNP would field one candidate.
Since the Democratic Labor Party would also field a
candidate, there could be three progressive candidates, Lee
said.
7. (C) Lee said Roh will try to emphasize that the
progressives would support peace and a GNP candidate would
upset the "peace mood" Roh hoped to create on the Peninsula
this summer and fall with a summit and other "shows." Roh
also hoped to focus the campaign on North-South issues rather
than on the economy. Normal citizens were not deeply
interested in North Korea or security issues -- they simply
wanted to live a better life. Lee said both DJ and Roh
thought the strategies that got them elected could result in
another progressive administration. But the Korean
electorate had changed a lot since 2002, Lee said, and their
old strategies would likely prove ineffective.
-----------
REGIONALISM
-----------
8. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query about the
effect regionalism would have on the upcoming election, Lee
said he maintained a 25-30 percent support rating in the
southwestern Jeolla Provinces. Lee asserted that the era of
any candidate receiving 90 percent support in Jeolla was over
and if he received 20 percent in December, that would assure
victory for him.
---
BDA
---
9. (C) Lee asked why the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) problem had
not been solved. The Ambassador noted that BDA had, in a
sense, been solved since North Korea could retrieve its money
since the accounts were unblocked on April 10. But North
Korea was insisting on a wire transfer and this was proving
difficult given other banks' reluctance to handle tainted
funds. Lee wished the U.S. good luck, saying that he hoped
the BDA funds issue would be over soon and the Six-Party
Talks would succeed in denuclearizing North Korea while the
Ambassador was in Korea. The Ambassador said it was
unnatural to have a continued state of crisis in Northeast
Asia and this situation could lead to a regional arms race.
Until North Korea denuclearizes, it would be difficult to
give much assistance to the DPRK to overcome its economic
differences. Lee said that the North Korean nuclear problem
should be solved through close cooperation by the ROK with
China and the U.S.
----------------------------
MYSTERIOUS AID TO THE NORTH?
----------------------------
10. (C) Lee noted that if North Korea did not receive rice
aid soon, the people would suffer. He also noted that there
were many trucks going into North Korea from Gangwon Province
and no one was sure of the contents. According to Gangwon
citizens Lee met recently, the trucks going North were well
covered. If the trucks were carrying construction materials
for Mt. Geumgang as reported, there would be no reason to
obscure the contents. Many Gangwon residents distrust the
Roh administration and therefore were suspicious of the
cargo.
-------------
JUNE 2 SPEECH
-------------
11. (C) Lee said he was shocked by President Roh's four-hour
speech on June 2 in front of 1000 of his supporters and was
worried about the impression foreign observers would have of
South Korea after viewing the speech. Roh's explicit
comments about presidential candidates and his statement that
"the thought of the GNP winning makes me shudder in horror"
were in violation of election law. Lee said the tirade, in
which Roh criticized all the presidential candidates except
those loyal to him, would serve to unite his ardent
supporters.
---------------------
VIRGINIA TECH TRAGEDY
---------------------
12. (C) Lee noted that anti-Americanism would not be an
issue in this year's election thanks in part to changed
perceptions in Korea. The U.S. public reaction to the tragic
incident at Virginia Tech taught Koreans much about America
-- Koreans expected a backlash against Koreans and
Korean-Americans, but Americans did not consider the
Korean-American student who committed the murders to be
representative of Korea or Koreans. The fact that Americans
thought of the Korean-American shooter as one unfortunate
psychopath rather than blaming Korea or Koreans was
fortunate. The Ambassador agreed that the U.S. people
handled the situation well and said that in the U.S. we think
of individual responsibility first.
---
FTA
---
13. (C) The Ambassador explained that some clarifications
were needed to the KORUS FTA chapters on labor and
environment, but that the clarifications would in no way
change the balance of the agreement. He added he hoped Korea
would ratify the FTA before the December election. Lee
agreed that the FTA should be ratified, but noted that if the
ratification process were too close to the December election,
anti-American, anti-FTA sentiment could become an election
issue. Former Mayor Lee noted he was concerned the U.S.
ratification process might be delayed until 2008. Lee
cautioned that while most GNP lawmakers were pro-FTA, even
some conservative lawmakers from rural districts might be
hard-pressed by their constituents to vote against the FTA.
Koreans were very emotional; while this contributed to
Korea's dynamism, it also could cause difficulty for the FTA.
For example, one insignificant bone chip in a large beef
shipment can become a national issue.
14. (C) For a few beef or tangerine producers, Korea should
not abandon the KORUS FTA, Lee said. The FTA will benefit
all Korean consumers and create cheaper goods for all. The
government has a responsibility to act in the interest of all
Koreans. Lee joked that the emphasis on saving Korean beef
was already water under the bridge since Korean beef was not
really Korean since the cows eat U.S. feed. Excluding rice
from the KORUS FTA was very positive and would help
ratification in Korea.
15. (C) Lee said he oversaw Hyundai's production of the
Pony, the first Korean car exported to the U.S., and said
that he owed his success to the open U.S. market. If the
U.S. had not been open to Korean cars in the late 1970s,
Korea would not have developed as it did, Lee said. That
said, Lee expressed concern that Japanese cars assembled in
the U.S. could come to Korea and cause problems in the Korean
auto market. The Ambassador downplayed this concern, noting
that there was sufficient demand for Japanese cars in the
U.S. so there would likely be no need for Japanese producers
to export cars from the U.S. to Korea. It was important,
however, for Korea to live up to its commitment to open the
Korean market to U.S. auto imports.
---------------
OVERSEAS TRAVEL
---------------
16. (C) Lee said he hoped to travel to China and Russia
before the December election. But before that, he felt he
should go to the U.S., so he decided to go to Washington June
11-14. Lee requested a meeting with Secretary Rice, and
indicated he may participate in a portion of the June 13-14
meeting of the U.S. Korea Business Council. (He subsequently
cancelled his planned trip).
-------
COMMENT
-------
17. (C) Lee Myung-bak is confident and has the swagger, the
money and the organization of a front-runner. Many GNP and
even some progressives have joined Lee's camp because of his
commanding lead. However, there is no such thing as a sure
bet in Korean politics. While Lee has a commanding lead, a
landmark achievement in the heart of Seoul in the Cheonggye
Stream, and a solid background as a politician and CEO, he
may have overreached with his canal project. If Park or the
progressives can convince people the canal project is
far-fetched, old-fashioned or environmentally unwise, Lee's
support could shrink. For now, at least, he is widely
perceived as the man who could bring Korea to advanced-nation
status and revitalize the economy.
VERSHBOW
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'서울의 소리'가 보도한 http://j.mp/rqq4ab "한국소... 한우가 아니다. 한우를 살리자고 주장하는 것은 이미 물 건너간 것"이란 농담이 실린 버시바우와 MB의 2007-06-04 회동 보고 전문
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KBS 기자. 20년 넘게 탐사보도를 업으로 삼고 있다는 @kbsmuckraker의 블로그(Tell Me No Lie) http://blog.naver.com/rkaa21.do에 위키리크스 한국관련 전문 번역 연재 중
(위키리크스) -2008년 금융위원장이 외환은행 매각 심사계획 주한 미대사에게 알려 주었다고.
http://blog.naver.com/rkaa21.do
어륀지 : "NATO" = no action, talk only... RT @newspresso: 버시바우: it remains unclear if she is taking orders from someon… http://j.mp/qyMzjU
Browse by Embassy Seoul. Released 2011-08-30
http://wikileaks.org/origin/52_0.html
위키리크스가 전하는 한미 FTA 우리측 대표들의 의심스러운 행동들 RT @ohmynews_korea http://bit.ly/o5W9Tx
박정희 "정주영, MB를 조심하라"
<위키리크스> "정주영, 돌봐주라는 말로 오해"
http://j.mp/oC5EQo
MB " 믿는 사람 있겠나"
"정주영이 젊었을 때인데 귀가 어둡겠나" 전면 부인
http://j.mp/mPNbLP
MB출세가도에 "look out for him" 을 잘 못 알아들은 행운이. http://j.mp/opacgP (미국무성전문 - 07SEOUL331)의 9 에 '사실이라면' 단서있음.
박정희 가카에 애절한 편지는 8항에
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06SEOUL864 http://j.mp/qXJLQX
/> 06SEOUL2505 http://j.mp/oCwMsT
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총체적 평가 http://j.mp/oP0NIR
대미관계 http://j.mp/pqGOuX
전작권 이양 http://j.mp/psmSHz
[미외교전문]경향-작년 대만 미 쇠고기 수입금지하자 한국 정부 국내 여론 악화 우려해 미국에 대만에 강력 조치를 주문 http://j.mp/nNhCSe
혼내줘 http://j.mp/mWrqHF
좋다고해줘 http://j.mp/nMVrI7
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박0: 07SEOUL3540 http://j.mp/q4hnCY
유종0:08SEOUL737 http://j.mp/qGYRSG
유명0:09SEOUL2021
US embassy cable -http://j.mp/okJ4nM에서
검색어 'Liancourt'로 Embassy Tokyo발을 검색한 결과
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US embassy cable -(프레시안) 盧 "독도에 일본배 오면 깨뜨려라"…美 "미친짓"
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06TOKYO2154 (2006-04-20) http://j.mp/niwDzk
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http://j.mp/nvzIuy
09SEOUL530 (2009-04-02 )
http://j.mp/oQvznR
US embassy cable -(경향) 김문수 “한국내 반강대국 정서… 반중 감정 커질 것”http://j.mp/r9Po5E
09SEOUL147 (2009-01-30 ) http://j.mp/ocs9Wz
/> 10SEOUL216 (2010-02-11) http://j.mp/ngskD0
경향) ‘MB 마지막 지지자는 노무현?’
http://j.mp/ngn0Bq
US embassy cable - 08SEOUL1174 (2008-06-11)
http://j.mp/oLtbTL
미 대사관이 전한 이상득 의원의 말 http://bit.ly/pz85fq
미국 대사관의 눈에 비친 노 대통령 자살, RT @ohmynews_korea http://bit.ly/oQz4Kk
관련 US embassy cable - 09SEOUL894 (2009-06-05)
http://j.mp/opGMAU
김과 함이 분석하는 2009초 정국
MB의 인사 성향과 그 파장. (나중 국회의장에 대해 너무 심하게 말) http://j.mp/oozbDm (2009-01-07)의 6
MB가 2008 쇠고기를 오판한 까닭은 이와 김의 말들어서: 위 전문의 3
MB 집권초 현인택이 중용되지 못한 이유와 미친 영향과 유명환이 장관된 이유 http://j.mp/oozbDm (2009-01-07)의 7
주미대사 이태식이 유임된 이유 위 전문의 8
(국민)2007년 샘물교회 신도들이 아프가니스탄에서 피랍됐을 때 우리 정부는 미국에만 의존해 문제를 해결하려 했다고 http://j.mp/n20lIB
관련 전문 http://j.mp/oO3r86 http://j.mp/oO3r86
[한국이전하는 미 외교전문]
■ 2007년 아프가니스탄에서 발생한 샘물교회 교인 납치사건 해결 과정
8월 4일과 7일 아프간 정부가 한국인의 희생 위험을 무릅쓴 채 구출작전에 나서지 못하도록 해 달라고 미국 측에
8월 27일 정부가 '테러세력에 잘못된 메시지를 줄 수 있다'는 미국을 이해시키려 적극적으로 노력한 정황
21명 모두 플려 난 8월 31일 미국 측이 자이툰 부대 파병 연장을 예상
http://j.mp/nIhhS8
(국민) 김성환: 2008년 쇠고기 수입 반대 시위로 인해 부시의 방한이 연기된 것은 수치스럽다.
버시바우: 그는 숙련된 외교관으로 모든 미국적인 것을 편히 여긴다 http://j.mp/n20lIB
관련전문: http://j.mp/oujiDa
한겨레)이상득 “선거전패 우려…쇠고기 재개방 미루자” http://bit.ly/oaRDfu
이,전 발언 전문 http://j.mp/oUDC7d 박 발언 전문 http://j.mp/p3F6OT
(한겨레)
MB “기자 없어서 하는 이야기인데..…미 쇠고기 싸고 좋아” http://bit.ly/nSByx6
원문 http://j.mp/opXa2c 의 6
현장관의 개인 생각이라고 부정... 요거 보여 주세요. 08SEOUL707
http://j.mp/pazWiS
이 당선자 쇠고기 문제 4월 중순 한미 정상회담 전까지 해결
2009년 9월24일 미 대사 “FTA, 미국이 한국 묶어둘 도구”
http://j.mp/q
[경향-외교전문 공개]
2006년 이명박 시장, 미 대사에게 노무현 정권은 “반미감정으로 만들어진 정권.노에 대한 경멸을 표현
2007년 12월10일, 12월19일 : BBK
2008년 <br /> 2월 :친박계에 대한 ‘공천학살’
5월 미국산 쇠고기 파동 때 미대사와 박근혜의 설전
2008년 11월13일 :미대사와 박근혜 면담록
http://j.mp/nftEqk
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